Philosophy of Science 4 Questions on Copernicus and Gallileo Summary

December 2010 - Second Year - Philosophy of science : 4 questions about Copernicus and Galileo (600 words)

From Osiander's Foreward to De Revolutionibus, find at least two arguments for instrumentalism. Support your answer with quotations.

In Osiander's foreward, he contrasted the attitude of philosophers, as seekers of truth, to scientists, as seekers of theories to correctly compute and predict phenomena. The method of the scientist is to seek the simplest explanation to explain the phenomena - "If the causes are devised by the imagination... merely to provide a reliable basis for computation... the astronomer will take as his first choice the hypothesis which is easiest to grasp" - so readers should not be concerned with the way Copernicus' findings challenges their religious beliefs and convictions of truth about the universe. It is an instrumentalist argument because it posits that scientists cannot know the truth and that this should not worry us, the scientists role is merely to advance plausible explanations, which can be improved upon or replaced by subsequent explanations that better fit the data.

Furthermore, Osiander  tells the reader: "These hypotheses need not be true nor even probable... If they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough." He is further reinforcing that the reader should not be concerned by Copernicus' theories, merely their instrumental value in explaining the path of the planets.

 Using arguments and examples from Copernicus' Preface to De Revolutionibus, explain the difference between a simple theory, a complex theory, and a coherent theory. Is a coherent theory necessarily simple?

 Simplicity and complexity are relative terms, so a theory we might consider complex compared to another could appear simple compared to yet another theory. Furthermore, a single theory might be simple in some respects, yet complex in others. So the issues we are really concerned with in this question is whether we should favour simpler theories over more complex ones, and whether coherence necessitates simplicity.

 There are two important ideas to consider. The first is a rough interpretation of Occam's razor, which is when comparing multiple theories that explain a phenomena, the theory which introduces the lesser amount of independent assumptions is the theory most likely to be correct (or to be more useful, at least). We should favour simpler theories over more complex ones but only when both theories create correct predictions. Secondly, we should seek explanatory theories that are as simple as possible but no simpler. The 'no simpler' part of this answer is critical. Even if a theory appears complex, we cannot remove components of it merely to make it simpler.  The coherence of the theory - it must make sense, create correct predictions, and not introduce contradictions - cannot be compromised for the sake of simplicity, and so sometimes a coherent theory will not seem simple at all.

In the preface to De Revolutionibus, Copernicus explained he was compelled to research the motion of the planets and the sun because the existing explanations were contrastingly simple yet incoherent or coherent yet complex- those using homocentrics producing calculations not corresponding to empirical observation, and those using eccentrics seeming to have resorted to ad hoc variations to their theories to produce correct results.

 Describe an instance where Galileo believed a theory that appeared to be contradicted by some observational evidence. Was he justified in doing so (i.e. did he have good theoretical arguments or observational evidence)?
Copernicus' theory that the earth and other planets revolved around the sun was contradicted by visual observation of Mars and Venus from Earth, by the naked eye. The calculations derived from his theory suggested that the visible size and brightness of both planets would vary considerably during their orbit,  and these variations were not confirmed by observation.

When any empirical observation produces results that do not confirm to a theory, we might think that automatically proves our theory incorrect. However, it may simply be the case that our theory is missing some detail which would explain the difference in observation. Furthermore, there may be factors influencing our method of observation, or interpretation of what is being observed, that mislead us. So we should not obviously disregard a theory backed by comprehensive supporting evidence, merely because of some exceptional observations.

In Galileo's case, hindsight certainly suggests he was justified to believe Copernicus' theory, but what can we say philosophically about his persistence with it? Galileo was able to argue against the empirical contradictions by improving the method of observation with the telescope. Using the telescope and pursuing a mathematical account of how bodies of different size would appear from a distance, Galileo was able to garner new observational data to support the theory. However, if we apply Peter Gallison's criteria to validate observational processes of directness and stability, we may question whether Galileo's telescoping findings had the stability to support the theory. It is clear at least that Galileo did seek both theoretical (mathematical account) and observational (via telescope) evidence to support Copernicus' theory.

 Explain Galileo's general solution to the problem of the apparent incompatibility of science and religion in his 'Letter to Christina'.
 Galileo's general solution the problem of an appearance of incompatibility of science and religion in his 'Letter to Christina' involves suggesting reasons why the literal interpretation of the bible may include counterfactuals as well as establishing a logical case that God would not have provided sensory perception and reason for diagnosis of scientific truth if he did not wish them to be used.

 Firstly, Galileo suggests the bible was written to be understood by the common people. The simplest and most accessible representation of information was therefore necessary, so that those with little education or sophistication could understand it and accept it. For this reason, more sophisticated individuals need to accommodate for this bias in the reading of religious texts, to look deeper than face value to interpret the true meaning.

Secondly, as a believer in God, Galileo credited God for imparting him with the sensory perception to make empirical observation, and the reasoning capacity to conduct rational inquiry. As god has provided these capacities, he must wish for human beings to use them in pursuit of scientific truth, so to deny that process is illogical.

Philosophy of Film Misc Summaries Assessment

December 2010 - Second Year - Philosophy of Film


Q1. Does Craig (the puppeteer) at the start of the film survive as Craig (trapped in Emily) at the end of the film? Why or why not? What complications are there to his survival? Give reasons. 

The movie being John Malkovich seems to presuppose that there can be physical and mental elements to the self, and suggests that one can have the experience of being self when disconnected from the physical. We encounter Craig's character at the beginning of the film as a person with a mind and a body. Later, Craig's mind is inside Malkovich and we are unaware of the whereabouts of his body. We cannot even be sure that his body hasn't been destroyed. Leaving Malkovich, Craig's mind is returned to his original body or to one that is identical to it, and later in the film Craig's mind is trapped in Emily.

When Craig is in his own body, in Malkovich, and in Emily, what is consisent in each case is Craig's mental states - his thoughts and beliefs, his memories, his desires. There is psychological continuity - Craig's mental states are persisted through time in a continuous way. I think this psychological continuity shows us that Craig has survived when he is in Malkovich and when he is in Emily.

Even though Craig survives in Malkovich and in Emily, he is not the same person. Personal identity and survival are not one and the same. Why is this, what are the markers of personal identity? Is it psychological continuity, or physical continuity, both, or something else? Personal identity is much more difficult to define than survival. At first it seems like a combination of physical and psychological continuity would be sufficient as markers for personal identity. These criteria would give the correct answer that Craig is not the same as Craig in Malkovich and Craig in Emily (though Craig survives, his physical state does not have continuity). But these criteria are problematic when we consider fission, as in the transporter case.

Suppose a transporter existed that allowed a person to be transported from Melbourne to New York in an instant. The process would work by destroying the person in Melbourne and creating a copy of their physical and mental states, in New York. We could say that physical and psychological continuity are preserved as the copy that is created is identical in every case. But suppose due to a machine malfunction two copies were created. Identity is a necessarily one to one relationship, it cannot exist for one to many, so it cannot be so that physical and psychological continuity are sufficient markers for personal identity. \

This is a problem Parfait explores when he makes his case that what matters is survival, rather than personal identity. It is persisted experience that is important, which is a sentiment that resonates with the characters of the film in two ways. Firstly, Craig is indeed surviving through the persistence of his psychological states, though his personal identity and physical states are changing. Secondly, Dr Lester is seeking survival over identity by desiring to continue his existence from other bodies, attaining a kind of immortality.


Crimes and Misdemeanors

Q3. After having got Delores murdered Judah is wracked with guilt. According to William's is this kind of guilt rational for a consequentialist? Should we take Judah's feelings into account when determining the utility of his actions?

It is rational to feel guilt when we have done the wrong thing - wrong according to the ethical framework we believe in. When our ethical framework is consequentialist, then an act is wrong when it does not maximise the type of value the framework is concerned with. When our ethical framework is classical utilitarianism, an act is wrong when it does not maximise psychological states of happiness. So if we are classical utilitarians and we bring about consequences that do not maximise happiness, we have done the wrong thing and are rational to feel guilty. If we maximise happiness and feel guilty, then we are acting irrationally.

If we try to evaluate the utility of someone else's actions, using a classical utilitarian framework, we must take their psychological states of happiness into consideration. All psychological states of happiness are relevant to our calculus, regardless of who is experiencing them. When we try to determine the utility of Judah having Dolores killed, we must consider how Judah will feel if he proceeds, just as we consider the frustrated future happiness of Dolores, and the preserved happiness of Judah's wife, family, and community. The narrative reveals to us that Judah is heavily influenced by his religious upbringing and we can foresee that if he has Dolores killed, he will feel guilty.

But we are evaluating Judah's actions from a classical utilitarian framework, a framework that plausibly says more happiness will result from Dolores being killed. By that framework, it is right to have Dolores killed - so doesn't that mean Judah's guilt is irrational? This is not the case - Judah's guilt would be irrational if he was a classical utilitarian, but he isn't. We are assessing all forseeable psychological states of happiness, regardless of who is experiencing them, so we must take Judah's guilt into consideration. It is reasonably foreseeable that Judah, with his religious upbringing, will feel guilt for having Dolores killed. He would be irrational to feel guilt if he was a classical utilitarian, but he is not, and so we must include those guilt feelings in our moral calculus.

 Q4. How does the treatment of "right" and "wrong" in Crimes and Misdemeanours refuse the resolution that is typical of Hollywood narrative cinema? 

Hollywood narrative cinema typically follows a three act formula. A situation or problem arises, the characters involved in the situation address it, and then the situation is resolved (or shifts into a new situation). Typically the third act's resolution satisfies typical moral criteria - the cheating husband gets caught, the murderer gets punished, the nice guy gets the girl. By the end of a typical Hollywood movie, good is rewarded, bad is punished, and the audience can leave with a sense of an orderly, just universe.

In Woody Allen's Crimes and Misdemeanours, this treatment is not the case. Rabbi Ben, the character who most embodies the good, becomes fully blind. Murderous Judah, most embodying the bad, has gotten away with murder, and someone else convicted of the crime. He has even stopped feeling guilty for what he has committed and is now enjoying his life as much as before the Dolores situation eventuated. Woody Allen's character Cliff's marriage has ended, but this is hardly a dramatic resolution for him, the marriage was loveless from the beginning of the film. He had largely been a sympathetic character throughout the film despite his romantic feelings for Hally whilst still married, but he is not to be rewarded. His arrogant brother-in-law's behaviour goes unpunished, and is even rewarded by his engagement to Hally.

So Crimes and Misdemeanours is atypical in the way it does not reward and punish the characters according to any moral framework the audience would share. Instead it seems to favour an existentialist viewpoint - it posits that there is no independent or objective moral authority, and that the only meaning in life is that which human beings can freely choose for themselves. The character in the film who espouses the view is Levy, but though the film's outcome vindicates this view, we see that Levy has not been adequately comforted by this philosophy, because he chooses to end his own life.

If we were to replace the film's actual third act with a more typical one, we would see Hally and Cliff together romantically, with a hugely successful documentary on Levy's life. In the actual film, Levy's death destroyed the possibility of Cliff proceeding with his documentary at all. Rabbi Ben's sight would not have continued to worsen, and perhaps his sight would even be restored by god. Cliff's brother in law would be exposed as the arrogant and self involved womanizer he had shown the audience to be, and Judah would be imprisoned. These outcomes would leave the audience with the sense of a moral universe, but instead Woody Allen creates a tragi-comedy that reinforces existentialist themes.

 MatrixQ5.
Explain and evaluate Putnam’s argument for the conclusion that the Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis is inconsistent? 

The brain in a vat hypothesis is a sceptical hypothesis, it proposes that what we believe we know to be true may not actually be true. We think we are having a physical experience of the world, of a blue sky, of sitting in a lecture theatre, but we may not be actually having that experience. We might really be brains in a vat, hooked up to electrodes stimulating neurons and creating the perception of the blue sky, and the lecture theatre. We might be being deceived.

Putnam has a semantic argument to demonstrate that the hypothesis is inconsistent. The argument rests on the idea that when the deceived experience had by the brain in a vat formulates the thought "I could be a brain in a vat", the thought does cannot meaningfully refer to a brain or a vat, only the image of a brain in a vat, which is something quite different.  How does language meaningfully refer to anything? Well suppose we had a towel, and we had a Chinese noun for the word towel and a French noun for the word towel. The French word, the Chinese word, and the English word "towel" all refer meaningfully to the same towel. But Putnam's argument is we do not have this meaningful reference when the brain in a vat conceives of being a brain in a vat - the brain in a vat can only conceive of being something like a brain-vat-brain in a brain-vat-vat.

Putnam's argument is that a brain in a vat cannot formulate a semantically correct idea that it may be a brain in a vat and therefore the idea is self refuting. I think he is correct here - yes, what a brain in a vat could conceive of is a separate thing from what actually is - the brain-vat-brain image refers to something different to the brain itself. The example he provides is useful - if an ant randomly traces a line in the sand which spells "Winston Churchill", it does not meaningfully refer to the actual historical figure Winston Churchill, because it is impossible for the ant to conceive of him.  But I do not think that Putnam's argument proves that we are not brains in vats, only that we cannot accurately describe the possibility that we are.

I think what we are really concerned about when we consider the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is not whether we are precisely brains in vats (in which case, Putnam's semantic argument would certainly threaten the precision and exactness of our hypothesis) but whether what we are experiencing might not truly be reality. And this is a concern because we expect our experience to be authentic, to be objective, and feel undermined by the notion this not be the case. Chalmers matrix-as-metaphysics argument is far more useful here than Putnam's argument. Where Putnam tells us we haven't accurately described our possible predicament, Chalmers tells us we should not feel undermined. Chalmers tells us that it is our experience of reality that is important. If we are brains in vats, it is still true that we are in the lecture theatre of looking at the blue sky, it's only the metaphysical truth about what constitutes a lecture theatre or a blue sky that is different to what we first conceived.

Bernard Williams Defusers of Subjectivism Summary Assessment

April 2011 - Second Year - Ethics

What is the view held by those Williams calls ‘defusers of subjectivism’?
Some people are unnerved (or made uncomfortable) by the philosophical doctrine of subjectivism, which has as one of its tenets that there are no objective moral facts. Defusers of subjectivism argue the discomfort arises from mistaken ideas of what follows from subjectivism. By correcting these mistakes, they seek to make subjectivism a more acceptable theory. Firstly, the defusers tell us, indifference does not logically follow from subjectivism. To think that it does would be to make the mistake of equating subjectivism with moral relativism. Secondly, the defusers make a more ambiguous claim: subjectivism ‘leaves everything where it was’ and does not encourage other practical consequences.

Williams offers some reasons that support ‘the defusers of subjectivism’. What are
those reasons?
A person could be indifferent because she believes (subjectively) that she is not justified in judging anyone else, but this would be to believe that there are some objective facts she doesn’t have access to, and objective facts are incompatible with subjectivism. Alternatively, she could be indifferent because she believes that no one is justified in judging anyone else, but this position requires that belief to be held in a ‘mid air position’, which is not compatible with subjectivism. The mid air position is a place for thought outside the individual’s subjective thoughts, and so it can feature facts, but not moral thought.

What is the argument that Williams supposes shows that ‘the defusing operation’
succeeds ‘in certain vital respects’?
In science when there are persistent disputes despite the same facts, concepts, and observation, it is rational for the disputers to acknowledge the matter is genuinely uncertain, when they cannot reach agreement. This reasoning, applied to moral disputes, would produce relativism. But the nature and extent of moral and factual disagreement are different. The defuser argues it is not a requirement of rationality that we apply this reasoning to moral disagreement. This contrast should not worry us - morality does not need to mirror the world of empirical facts, because it is normative rather than descriptive – it tells us how we ought change the world, not how the world is.

What remaining difficulties does Williams see for ‘defusers of subjectivism’?
The defusers have not succeeded in eliminating all practical consequences of subjectivism that might worry us. Firstly, in excluding the possibility of moral facts, it seems the subjectivist excludes constraints on moral thoughts. But we don’t think moral thoughts could be entirely creative, we think constraints are necessary (so we can reject attempts at moral thinking like ‘all jews ought to be killed’). Secondly, in arguing that morality comes from the will, but morality is something we decide, there seems to be a contradiction. Either we are psychologically attuned to act morally, or we must take action (like deliberation) to decide and then act morally.

How—if at all—might ‘defusers of subjectivism’ respond to Williams’ final
criticism?
I think defusers of subjectivism would appeal to facts about human nature as potential constraints on the kind of conclusions we could draw as moral conclusions. These types of appeal are to things about our psychology or biology that gear us towards sympathy, to temperance, to altruism. They would also appeal to these types of facts to argue that we are drawn to deliberate, and drawn to live an examined life. But these rely on strong empirical notions that may not have adequate foundation, and don’t give an obvious example of how we could excuse someone who (perhaps due to mental illness, or not) makes claims such as ‘all jews ought to be killed’ and claims moral legitimacy for these views, as they are views held subjectively.

Nagel Pansychism Summary Assessment

January 2011 - Second Year - Philosophy of Mind Summary - Pansychism (Nagel) 

Explain why (according to Nagel) one might believe in panpsychism.

Panpsychism is the view that mental substance is fundamental and ubiquitous. Like dualism, panpsychism holds that there are both mental and physical substances that are non reducible (so they are fundamental). Panpsychism differs from dualism is in claiming mental substances are everywhere or omnipresent (ubiquity: the 'pan' in 'panpsychism' means all). It is the ubiquitous part of the claim that seems so bizarre - it would mean all physical components of the universe have mental properties - including things that aren't living organisms, like a rock, and things that are very small, like a cell.

Nagel offers a four premise argument in support of a panpsychic conclusion. The first premise is material composition : living things are complex systems composed of physical matter. This seems reasonable - we have no evidence of any non material constituents. Nagel's second premise is anti-reductivism - a denial that mental states are implied by physical states. This is a denial of accounts such as the identity theory which seek to identify all mental states with physical states. The third premise - anti-eliminativism - is that mental states are real; we cannot analyse mental states (and therefore the mind body problem) away.

The fourth premise is anti-emergence. Anti-emergence is the view that all properties of systems are derived from its constituents and how they are combined (excluding the properties of it in relation to something else). New properties (like consciousness) do not somehow emerge. The anti emergence view holds that properties appearing to emerge reveal an epistemological problem - there must either be constituents we are not aware of, or some undiscovered properties of the constituents we are aware of. If anti-emergence is correct, an appearance of consciousness emerging is due to unknown properties or constituents - such as mental states being fundamental and ubiquitous.

So physical beings are experiencing mental states, and these mental states are neither directly implied from their physical states nor emerging as a result of the complexity of the arrangement of their physical matter. This means that the mental states must have been present in the constituents of the physical matter, and as they have not emerged along some causal chain, they must have been present at the absolute lowest level. Nowhere on the continuum from the smallest possible physical matter (like superstrings, or something even smaller we have not discovered) and the most complex system like human beings can a source of mental matter be located, so it must be present at the lowest possible level.

Nagel does not find panpsychism to be a wholly plausible account for the mind body problem, concluding that it should be added to the list of unacceptable solutions. It is difficult to imagine how it would work, to have the complex mental states of humans comprised of mental properties at the lowest possible level. If the ability to feel sad does not emerge somewhere on the line of complexity, then would a rock or a speck of dust have the ability to feel sad? It seems unintelligible. So the panpsychic account is not now obviously more credulous than at least some of theories denied in the four premises. We could dispute each of the above premises and end up embracing other theories - substance dualism, the identity theory, some kind of theory that denies the reality of mental states, or emergence.

Hume Summary Assessment - 'Of the Influencing Motives of the Will'

Written March 2011 (second year) - Ethics Summary - 500 Words

 1. What two claims does Hume endeavor to prove? (Paragraph 1) (2 marks)

Hume is responding to traditional views that right action can and should be determined by reason, arguing two claims in opposition to these views. The first claim is that reason can never motivate action (in isolation from passions or emotions). The second claim is that reason can never oppose or prevent actions motivated by passions or emotions.

2. What two operations of the understanding does Hume distinguish? (Paragraph 2) (2 marks)

Hume identifies two ways understanding (reason) exerts itself: demonstrative and probabilistic. Demonstrative reasoning is deductive; it allows us to draw specific claims from general ideas. Probabilistic (or causal) reasoning is inductive; it allows us to make general claims from specific ones.

3. How does Hume argue that the first operation of the understanding is never the sole cause of our actions? (Paragraph 2) (2 marks)

Hume draws a distinction between the world of ideas and the world of realities. Our motivation to act is concerned with realities, with specific ends and purposes (like wanting to clear a debt). Contrastingly, our reason is concerned with the world of ideas, with means for those ends (like aggregating numerical sums to calculate the total owed). Hume thinks it is generally accepted that the world of ideas and world of realities are so removed from one another no one would argue deductive reasoning could be the sole cause of action.

4. How does Hume argue that the second operation of the understanding is never the sole cause of our actions? (Paragraph 3) (2 marks)

Hume explains that probabilistic reason allows us to discover the relations between cause and effect. We then direct our actions in ways that cause our desired effects (ends). The choice of end arises from our passions; reason does not direct the choice to act, only which means to exercise. If we were emotionally indifferent to any cause or end, reason could never motivate us to be concerned with it.

5. How does Hume then go on to argue that reason alone is incapable of opposing passion in the direction of the will? (Paragraph 4) (3 marks)

Hume argues that if reason has force to generate action, it necessarily has force to counter action. This is consistent with the way we conceive of force in general, that it can initiate as well as oppose. He then draws on his earlier argument that reason alone cannot initiate action; if we accept that argument we should accept that reason cannot obstruct action willed by emotions.

6. What further considerations does Hume advance in support of his two main claims? (Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7) (4 marks)

Hume argues that we cannot use reason to say our desire ends are false or unreasonable, but there are two types of cases when it would appear that reason is showing our desired ends to be wrong. Both cases are factual mistakes about how our desired ends can be achieved.  In the first case, we believe that a thing exists, when it does not. In the second case, we believe a certain means will produce a specific end, when it will not.

When our factual misunderstandings are corrected, the originally desired end (born from emotion rather than reason) will persist. What will not persist is the means we desired, the means we had been directed to by our mistakes of reason.The impact of this is Hume can be right that man is driven by his emotions, without being impervious to reason: as emotion dictates ends, reason supplies the means. Reason performs the role of slave or servant to passion.

7. What is the main point of Hume’s discussion of ‘calm passions’? (Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10) (5 marks)

Hume is using the notion of the struggle between calm passions and violent passions to replace the traditional metaphysical conception of a struggle between passion and reason.  He explains two types of calm passions that may be commonly mistaken for reason, providing an explanation for human kindness and charity as well as a general propensity to seek goodness.

Violent passions have a powerful influence on the will and may make people act in ways that are threatening to other people - this could seem a problem for Hume seeking to ground a theory of morality in emotions. So Hume also wishes to illustrate that calm passions, those he associates with good and moral behavior, can constrain other more violent passions.   Hume argues that these violent passions can actually be sensible (in a self-defense situation) and that when they are not sensible, calm passions can counteract them.

When an agent is observed to have a conflict of will to act in a violent or calm way, and chooses the calm, Hume is arguing that this is the effect of their calm passion rather than reason.

Bibliography

Hume, David (1888) ‘Reason and Passion’ in Peter Singer (ed.) Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press p.118-23